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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
SHANE MARK KARTCHNER,

Case No. 981736-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant,
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (1996).

STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The

fourth

amendment

to

the

federal

constitution

provides:
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons,
houses,
papers,
and
effects,
against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW,
AND PRESERVATION BELOW
1.

Whether the trial court's factual finding that "The

Deputy then asked if the defendant had outstanding warrants and the
defendant responded that he probably did" is clearly erroneous?
Standard of review.
clear error.

Factual findings are reviewed for

Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).

This subsidiary factual finding is preserved below by Mr.
Kartchner's

motion

(memorandum),

77-81

to

suppress

(memorandum

(R.

26-7

(motion),

28-31

105-124

(reply

in opposition),

memorandum in support), 84-104 (transcript of 12/30/97 preliminary
hearing),

184

suppress)).
157-164

(transcript

of

6/4/98

hearing

on

motion

to

See also Mr. Kartchner's conditional guilty plea, R.

(statement

of

defendant,

certificate

of

counsel,

and

order).

2.

Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the

contraband found on Mr. Kartchner was not an improper fruit of an
illegal suspicionless detention?
Standard of Review.
In reviewing a trial court's decision to grant
or deny a motion to suppress, findings of fact will not
be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. State v.
Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991);
Utah
R.Civ.P. 52(a) (1990).
However, in reviewing the
court's conclusions of law, we apply a correction of
error standard. Steward, 806 P.2d at 215.
State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 654 (Utah App. 1992).

»[T]he

reasonable-suspicion legal standard is one that conveys a measure
of discretion to the trial judge when applying that standard to a
given set of facts."

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994) .

Preserved below by motion to suppress and conditional
guilty

plea.

R.

26-7

(motion),

28-31

(memorandum),

77-81

(memorandum in opposition), 105-124 (reply memorandum in support),
84-104

(transcript

of

12/30/97

2

preliminary

hearing),

184

(transcript
( .

.-merit

of

6/4/98

hearing

on m o t i o n

" Kj f p n d a n t , r p i t if ir«at M

ill

to

suppress!;

ill I M M U ' V I

P

157-164

mini o r d e r ) .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Sharif r Id 1.1; Kartchner rfas char' led

I >y

i nf r iririat i on dated

October 23, 1997 with possession of a controlled substance and
possession of drug paraphernalia stemming from incidents occurring
on

J H , I " |l"

UC'Lobei

I""

I "I1"

"• "

K-u.. I I'hni'i

rum > 'i-'d I i

evidence seized as a result of his suspicionless

^ i i p p r p c i q ^ 1 1_

investigatory

R. 26 i; (motion) , 28-31 (memorandum) , 77-81 (memorandum in

stop.

opposition)

] 0 5 12 I

(:i : e p ] }

n: i: Lemoi andi n: i: i

i il

si lpp ID:t: it)

8 1 11 04

(transcript of 12/30/97 preliminary hearing), 184 (transcript of
6/4/9R heari rig on mot: on to si ippress)
13 6-9
Mx.

"The motion was denied,

R.

(f indings and conclusions, oi dei , attached as addei ldi in i B )
Kartchner

pled

conditionally

guilty

to

possession

of

a

conti • ulled substance • reservi ng the r:i ght to appeal the denial of
his motion

to

R , 15 ; 1 6 1

suppress .

(statement

•: f

def ei idai it,

certificate of counsel, and order) , Mr, Kartchner was sentenced to
prisi "in

i Jiisfiended pending sdf, i s fart" or*y completion of probation and

payment of fine.

The 12 month jail condition ui probation was

stayed pending this appeal.
I]i

R, 171-4

(attached as addendum A ) .

K artcliner i i c • v i a,j »pea] s t: lie deni a 1 of his motion to suppress .

STATEMENT OF FACTS
DepijI ,
October

lPr

1397

Slif-M i f f
at

4:lu

Mi" \\t\* I A s h l e ,
f !'l

»raveling
3

w>t , nn

routine

eastbound

on

patrol
jyuu

on

South

approaching State Street when he observed Mr. Kartchner standing in
the road, with a bicycle lying nearby partially in the road.

R.

86, 95-7. Deputy Ashley activated his overhead lights and stopped
to investigate.

R. 86, 97.

He asked Mr. Kartchner why he was

standing in the road, and he replied that "he'd just wrecked on his
bike" and had lost something.

R. 87, 97.

Deputy Ashley asked if

Mr. Kartchner was all right, and he responded affirmatively.
87.

Mr. Kartchner declined medical assistance.

R. 97.

Deputy

Ashley observed some scrape marks on Mr. Kartchner's elbows.
87, 97.

R.

R.

Deputy Ashley advised dispatch of the situation, then

asked Mr. Kartchner for his name.

R. 87-8, 98.

When asked for his name, Mr. Kartchner "hesitated as if
he didn't want to give it to me."

R. 184:7.

Deputy Ashley asked

him another two or three times, with no response. R. 184:7, --9-10.
Deputy Ashley testified that he needed Mr. Kartchner's name "so I
can do a report so that we're not liable later on down the street
down the road.
report."

For that reason I always get their name for the

R. 101.

The Deputy told Mr. Kartchner that he needed to

get his name for his police report.

R. 184:10.

Deputy Ashley

testified that, "As a police officer when we ask for information
we're entitled to have the information.

When it's not given then

I continue my investigation on the information that I needed."

R.

102.
Having received no response, Deputy Ashley then asked Mr.
Kartchner if he had a warrant.

R. 184:7.

Mr. Kartchner said "I

may have" or "I might have" or "I'm not sure if I have one."
4

R.

184 : 7 , - - 8
R

1 8 il ;

II

II Cull

I I:i :

K a r t c h n e r t h e n g a v e t h e d e p u t y h i s name .

E E:pi i/t:/; r ft si: il e] r t : ] I I I:i :

the w a r r a n t s check,

R

100

Kartchne] : t- :

<= il t: whi ] e he ran

184:8,

D e p u t y A s h l e y w a s i lot going to cite M r . K a r t c h n e r for
anyl.Ji ing , as 1 le I lad doi le i iot]

r?;e<"My,

K a r t c h n e r h a d n o t committed any traffic v i o l a t i o n s .
warrants

check

came, back p o s i t i v e .

ai i ested for ti ie w ai i: ai it

88 89

R. 88

R, 102, "The

i i i- : :i :i snt t : a:i : i : est:

R. 83-90

At least

two o t h e r p o l i c e officers and a trainee were present in a d d i t i o n to
D e p u t y Ashle>

I i!

In ruling
trial

court

made

11 0 3 1 .
o n M r , Kartchner's motion, to s u p p r e s s , the
findings

a n d conclusions

which

include

following:
4.
5.
6.
7.

8.
9.

1.

F o r traffic management and the d e f e n d a n t ' s safety,
D e p u t y A s h l e y activated h i s overhead lights a n d
exited h i s vehicle to assist the d e f e n d a n t .
T h e defendant explained that he h a d wrecked h i s
b i c y c l e o n the road.
D e s p i t e scrape marks o n the defendant's e l b o w s , t h e
d e f e n d a n t refused medical a s s i s t a n c e .
B a s e d o n the refusal of medical t r e a t m e n t , D e p u t y
A s h l e y inquired as to the d e f e n d a n t ' s name f o r
c o m p l e t i o n of h i s accident report and the defendant
refused to provide it.
T h e D e p u t y then asked if the defendant h a d
o u t s t a n d i n g arrest w a r r a n t s and the defendant
r e s p o n d e d that he p r o b a b l y did.
A t that time the Deputy directed the defendant t o
"wait"
while
he confirmed
the existence of
warrants.
CONCLUSIONS OF L A W
T h e a c t i v a t i o n of the Deputy's v e h i c l e ' s o v e r h e a d
lights d i d not constitute a seizure as its stated
and obvious purpose w a s to facilitate p u b l i c
safety.
5

I ""h ,

Mr. Kartchner was

P 3 sarch

r e v e a l e d m e t h a m p h e t a m i n e and p a r a p h e r n a l i a ,

I-: , 1 no ,

the

2.

Based on the defendant's refusal to give the Deputy
his name, coupled with the defendant's admission
that he probably had outstanding arrest warrants,
the Deputy had reasonable suspicion to direct the
defendant to wait while he checked for the
existence of warrants.

R. 137-8.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court's finding that Mr. Kartchner said he
"probably" had warrants is clearly erroneous.
testified to the contrary.

The only witness

In fact, Mr. Kartchner said he "may" or

"might" or "I'm not sure if I have one."
The trial court erred in refusing to suppress contraband
found on Mr. Kartchner.
Kartchner

did

not

After Deputy Ashley determined that Mr.

require

medical

assistance,

his

continued

questioning of Mr. Kartchner in the face of his refusal to give his
name, together with the surrounding circumstances, constituted a
fourth amendment seizure without reasonable suspicion.
Alternatively, even if no seizure occurred until Mr.
Kartchner was detained pending a warrants check, his refusal to
give his name coupled with his answer that he "may" have or "might"
have or "I'm not sure if I have" a warrant did not constitute
reasonable suspicion of a criminal offense sufficient to justify
the detention.
suppressed.

The fruits of this illegality should have been
The

trial

court's

suppression

order

should

be

reversed, and the case remanded to allow Mr. Kartchner to withdraw
his conditional plea.

6

ARGUMENT
POINT

Fully
Kartchner

il . T H E TRIAL COURT 1 ' S FACTUAL FINDING T H A T
I •• . KARTCHNER INDICATED "THAT H E P R O B A B L Y D I D "
H A V E OUTSTANDING A R R E S T W A R R A N T S IS C L E A R L Y
ERRONEOUS.
marshalled, 1

said, concerning

the evidence

his warrants

addressing

s*'a:us

Deputy r Ash ] ey test: £ i * K i J i i I M : i • i e] :i mi i
A:
a warrant
name then
I advised

:;

what M r .

as follows,

• -•.--;* .

I'm not sure. H e told m e that he p r o o a b l y h a d
after I [--] after he hesitated to give m e h i s
he said he m a y have a w a r r a n t , So at: that time
him,, that I needed to check --.at.

R . 1 0 1 . A t the suppression hearing, he clarified this testimony:
A
I tl lii lk I a s k e d h i m [foi ..__- ..^:ndj i *w o r t h r e e
times.
T h e n I a s k e d h i m if h e h a d a w a r r a n t , a s a
q u e s t i o n , "Do y o u have a w a r r a n t ? "
Q
H o w d i d he respond?
A
H e said, ["]I m a y have o n e , ["" ] something to
that e f f e c t , ["]I might have one.["J
Q
But he . eci '"~" - ^ Relieve tl iat„ tl lei e i i ia> b e
one?
A
Yeah.
R. 1 8 4 : 7
Q
£_ :
^a 1:11
., . _ irb, ir^-i , 1 probably
have warrants. :"'• And
~r r^inr vou said, [,f]Wait
here whil- I ^._-v
A
Yeah. I don't: Know _i ne sa^a "proc^oly." I
think ne said, "I may have," or "I'm not sure if I have
one."
So that put a doubt ; r. ~^ • .
1: " r may have
one .
R. 184:8

X

E. g. In re Estate of Bartell. 776 P., 2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989)
("An appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings
and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's
findings are so lacking in support, as to be 'against the clear
weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'")
(quoting State v. Walker, 743 P 2d 191, 1,93 (Utah 1987)).
;

The trial court's finding that Mr. Kartchner indicated
"that he probably did" have outstanding arrest warrants
lacking in support as to be
evidence,"

thus making

it

"against the clear weight

"clearly

erroneous."

While

is so
of the
on one

occasion Deputy Ashley started to say that Mr. Kartchner indicated
he probably had warrants, he corrected himself and testified Mr.
Kartchner indicated he "may" have a warrant.

R. 101.

suppression

the

hearing,

Deputy

Ashley

corrected

At the

prosecutor's

conclusory statement that Mr. Kartchner indicated he probably had
warrants, and testified to the contrary that "I don't know if he
said 'probably.'"

R. 184:8.

If the only percipient witness to

testify did not know, it is hard to understand how the judge could.
The

trial

reversed.

court's

finding

is

clearly

erroneous

and

must

be

The evidence firmly establishes that Mr. Kartchner only

said that "I may have" or "I might have" or "I'm not sure if I have
one."

R. 184:7, --8, R. 101.

POINT II . THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
SUPPRESS THE CONTRABAND FOUND ON MR. KARTCHNER
AS FRUIT OF AN ILLEGAL SUSPICIONLESS SEIZURE.
A.
The

CONTROLLING LEGAL PRINCIPLES.

operative

legal

principles

necessary

for

a

determination of this case were ably set forth by this Court in
Truiillo:
The search and seizure limitations of the
fourth amendment apply to "investigatory stops" or
"seizures" that fall short of official arrests. Terry,
392 U.S. at 16-17, 88 S.Ct. at 1877.
A seizure within
the meaning of the fourth amendment occurs only when the
officer by means of physical force or show of authority
8

has in some way restricted the liberty of a person."
Mendenhall. 446 U.S. at 553, 100 S.Ct. at 1876 (citing
Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, n. 16, 88 S.Ct. at 1879, n. 16).
When a reasonable person, based on the totality of the
circumstances, remains, not in the spirit of cooperation
with the officer's investigation, but because he believes
he is not free to leave a seizure occurs. Id. at 544,
555, 100 S.Ct. at 1870, 1877.
The United States Supreme Court has illustrated
situations which may result in a "seizure":
Examples of circumstances that might indicate a
seizure, even where the person did not attempt to
leave, would be the threatening presence of several
officers, the display of a weapon by an officer,
some physical touching of the person of the
citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice
indicating that compliance with the officer's
request might be compelled.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. at 1877 (citations
omitted).
In contrast, a seizure within the meaning of
the fourth amendment does not occur when a police officer
merely approaches an individual on the street and
questions him, if the person is willing to listen.
Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 S.Ct. 1319,
1324, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (citations omitted)."
However, the person approached is not required to answer
the officer's questions, Id. at 498-99, 103 S.Ct. at
1324-25; Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. at 1877,
and his refusal to listen to the officer's questions or
answer them, without more, does not furnish reasonable
grounds for further detention. Rover, 460 U.S. at 499,
103 S.Ct. at 1325.
State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87-8 (Utah App. 1987).
Stated differently:
Unless the circumstances of the encounter are so
intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person
would have believed he was not free to leave if he had
not responded, one cannot say that the questioning
resulted in a detention under the Fourth Amendment. But
if the persons refuses to answer and the police take
additional steps -- such as those taken in Brown -- to
obtain an answer, then the Fourth Amendment imposes some
minimal level of objective justification to validate the
detention or seizure. United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S., at 554, 100 S.Ct., at 1877; see Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S., at 21, 88 S.Ct., at 1879.

9

I.N.S. v. Delaado, 466 U.S. 210, 216-7,
(1984) .

104 S. Ct.

1758, 1763

" [W] hile the police have the right to request citizens to

answer voluntarily questions concerning unsolved crimes they have
no right to compel them to answer."

Davis v. Mississippi, 3 94 U.S.

721, 727 n.6, 89 S. Ct. 1394, 1397 n.6, 22 L.Ed.2d

676

(1969);

accord Delaado, 466 U.S. at 227, 104 S.Ct. at 1768.

B.

MR.
KARTCHNER
WAS
DETAINED
FOR
INVESTIGATIVE QUESTIONING UNSUPPORTED BY
REASONABLE SUSPICION.

For present purposes, the critical inquiry is whether Mr.
Kartchner was detained when Deputy Ashley continued to press him to
reveal his name after his initial refusal to do so, and ran a
warrants

check

on

him.

Mr.

Kartchner

advances

two

separate

theories: (1) that continued questioning under the totality of the
circumstances

when

Mr.

Kartchner

refused

to

give

his

name

constituted a detention unsupported by reasonable suspicion, or
alternatively
suspicion

(2) that

Deputy Ashley

did

not

have

reasonable

to detain Mr. Kartchner while performing

a warrants

check.
When Deputy Ashley approached Mr. Kartchner, he activated
his overhead

lights.

R.

97, 13 7

(finding 4) .

Activation of

overhead lights is a sufficient show of authority to constitute a
seizure.

In State v. Davis, 821 P.2d.9 (Utah App. 1991), a police

officer pulled up behind a car stopped by the side of the road.
This court held that merely pulling up behind the stopped vehicle
did not effect a detention.

Id. at 12. However, "The officer then
10

detained Davis by a display of authority when he activated the
overhead lights on his vehicle."
940 P.2d 1225, 1228

Id.

See also State v. Struhs,

(Utah App. 1997)

(activation of lights, in

conjunction with other factors, supported finding of seizure).

But

see State v. Hanson, 504 N.W.2d 219 (Minn. 1993) (no seizure where
officer pulled behind car parked on shoulder and activated lights,
because a reasonable person "would know that while flashing lights
may be used as a show of authority, they also serve other purposes,
including warning oncoming motorists in such a situation to be
careful") . At this juncture, any detention that may have occurred
was reasonable.
1992),

this

caretaker
amendment.

In Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360 (Utah App.

Court

outlined

exception

the

parameters

to the warrant

of

requirement

the
of

community
the

fourth

Community caretaker stops are reasonable when

(1) a

seizure occurs, (2) objectively premised on a bona fide community
caretaker function, (3) under circumstances evidencing an imminent
danger to life or limb.

Id. at 365.

Deputy Ashley testified that

"I had to stop the traffic so he didn't get run over . . . "
Traffic was fairly heavy.
their

inception.

concerning

the

R. 96.

R. 86.

His actions were justified at

Similarly, his questioning of Mr. Kartchner
extent

of

any

injuries

and

whether

medical

assistance was necessary was appropriately limited in scope to
community caretaking.
However, any further detention is problematic:
Once a person is seized for Fourth Amendment
purposes, the seizure does not cease simply because the
police formulate an uncommunicated intention that the
seized person may go his or her way. For the seizure to
11

end, it must be clear to the seized person, either from
the words of an officer or from the clear import of the
circumstances, that the person is at liberty to go about
his or her business. United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d
537, 540-41 (10th Cir. 1994).
State v. Hiqqins, 884 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1994).

At no time was

Mr. Kartchner informed that he was free to leave.
1.

Mr. Kartchner was seized when Deputy
Ashley continued to press him for
information
after
his
initial
refusal to give his name.

After Mr. Kartchner declined to give his name, a seizure
occurred

(if not

earlier)

at

least

as of when

continued to press him for that information.

Deputy

Ashley

"[W]hile the police

have the right to request citizens to answer voluntarily questions
concerning unsolved crimes they have no right to compel them to
answer."

Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 n.6, 89 S. Ct.

1394, 1397 n.6, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969); accord Delcrado, 466 U.S. at
227, 104 S.Ct. at 1768.
Deputy Ashley testified concerning his usual practice:
A:
Anytime I do this any kind of accident of this
sort I did one the day before I always get the name so I
can do a report so that we're not liable later on down
the street down the road. For that reason I always get
their name for the report.
Because
Mr.
Kartchner

hesitated,
continued
Q:
A:

acted nervous about giving me his name then I
to try to find out what his name was.
But you would not let him leave at that point?
That's
correct.

Q:
He had the absolute right to get up and go
didn't he?
A:
Urn, I was just trying to do an investigation of
not giving me the information I need.
Q:
Now Mr. Kartchner hadn't hit anything else had
he on his bicycle?
A:
No.
Q:
This bicycle had flipped.
He had no[t]
collided with anyone?
12

A:
As a police
officer
when we ask for
information
we're entitled
to have the information.
When it's
not
given then I continue my investigation
on the
information
that I needed.
Down the road if he gave a wrong name
then I wouldn't be able to give the report I needed to
give.
R. 101-2 (emphasis added).
Deputy Ashley requested Mr. Kartchner's name a total of
at least 3 or 4 times.
first

only

asked

R. 184:7, --9-10.

for Mr. Kartchner's

While he may have at
name,

Deputy

Ashley's

testimony makes clear that the tone changed at some point to a
demand.

R. 184:10 ("had to have it), 184:9 ("needed to do a report

and I needed his name") .
detained.

"Examples

of

As of that time, Mr. Kartchner was
circumstances

that

might

indicate

a

seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave, would be
the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a
weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the
citizen, or the

use of language

compliance

the officer's

with

or tone

request

of voice

might

indicating

be compelled."

that
United

States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64
L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (emphasis added).
In the face of Mr. Kartchner's refusal to give his name,
Deputy Ashley should have let him go.

"When a citizen expresses

his or her desire not to cooperate, continued questioning cannot be
deemed to be consensual."

Morgan v. Woessner, 997 F.2d 1244, 1253

(9th Cir. 1993), petition dismissed, 510 U.S. 1033, 114 S.Ct. 671,
126 L.Ed.2d 640 (1994) .
In State v. Gleason, 851 P.2d 731 (Wash. App. Div. 3
1993), an officer walked up behind Gleason, approached within arms
13

length,

and

"asked

identification."

him

why

he

was

there

and

demanded

Id. at 734. A second officer was getting out of

the police car at the same time.

The court held that there was a

sufficient show of authority to constitute a seizure.
In United States v. Palmer, 603 F.2d

1286

(8th Cir.

1979) , an officer motioned and called for the appellant and another
to cross the street towards him.

When the companion failed to

comply, the officer called a second time, "which indicates that the
pair were not free to continue down the street.

Clearly

[the

officer]fs actions constituted a sufficient show of authority to
restrain appellant's freedom of movement, therefore appellant was
seized."

Id. at 1289.
State v. Day, 461 N.W.2d 404 (Minn. App. 1990) is also

illustrative.

An officer stopped near the defendant in a filling

station, exited his car, and summoned the defendant to approach him
to answer questions.

Id. at 406.

The court found that a seizure

occurred:
We conclude the summoning by the police
officer, who was in uniform and armed, requiring
appellant to approach the officer's squad car to provide
identification and to respond to questioning, constitutes
a restraint and seizure under the fourth amendment.
Id. at 407.

Accord Barna v. State, 636 So.2d 571 (Fla. App. 4th

Dist. 1994)

(seizure occurred where two men in rear corner of

parking lot at 11:30 P.M. were approached by police, informed of
investigation of drug activity, thefts, and burglaries, were asked
for

identification,

and

warrants

check

was

performed).

See

generally 4 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.3(a), at 102-3 (3rd ed.
14

1996) ("On the other hand, an encounter becomes a seizure if the
officer engages in conduct which a reasonable man would view as
threatening
citizen."

or offensive even if performed by another private

This would include such tactics as pursuing a person who

has attempted to terminate the contact by departing,C1 continuing
to interrogate a person who has clearly expressed a desire not to
cooperate, [] . . .") .
Here, a reasonable person in Mr. Kartchner's situation
would not have felt free to leave.
a uniformed, armed officer.
vehicle were activated.

He was directly confronted by

The emergency lights on the officer's

His attempt to avoid questioning by the

officer had been ignored, and the officer continued to press him
for

information.2

He was not

free to

leave.

submitted to Deputy Ashley's show of authority.

Mr.

Kartchner

"When a reasonable

person, based on the totality of the circumstances, remains, not in
the spirit of cooperation with the officer's investigation, but
because he believes he is not free to leave a seizure occurs."
State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 (citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at
555, 100 S.Ct. at 1877).
This suspicionless detention violated Mr. Kartchner's
fourth amendment rights.

Contraband obtained in a search incident

to arrest should have been suppressed as unattenuated fruit of the
illegal seizure. United States v. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct.
407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
Additionally, backup officers may have been present. R. 1034 (indicating that at least 3 other officers were present, but not
indicating at what time they arrived).
15

2.

Alternatively, even Mr. Kartchner's
statement that he "may" or "might"
have warrants did not provided
reasonable suspicion to detain him
for the warrants check.

Even if no detention occurred until the warrants check
was performed, a constitutional violation has still occurred.

The

record is undisputed that Deputy Ashley ordered Mr. Kartchner to
wait while he ran a warrants check.
Detention pending
amendment seizure.

completion

R. 98-9, 100, 103, 184:8.

of a warrants

check

is a

fourth

State v. Johnson, 805 P. 2d 761, 762-3

(Utah

1991); State v. Munson. 821 P.2d 13, 15 (Utah App. 1991), State v.
Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985).
At the time Deputy Ashley detained Mr. Kartchner, he knew
that Mr. Kartchner had fallen off his bike (R. 87, 97) , that he had
declined medical assistance

(R. 97, 99) , that he had initially

refused to give his name (R. 88, 99, 184:7), and that he had said
he "might" or "may" or "I'm not sure if I have" warrants (R. 101,
184:7, - - 8 ) . Mr. Kartchner was coherent, stable, and alert.

R.

101.

R.

102.

Mr. Kartchner had not committed any traffic violation.
Deputy Ashley was not going

to cite Mr. Kartchner

anything, as he had done nothing incorrectly.

for

R. 100.

In total, these circumstances fail to rise to the level
of a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity so as to support a
detention.

No traffic violation had occurred.

A refusal

cooperate with police does not create reasonable suspicion:
He may not be detained even momentarily without
reasonable, objective grounds for doing so;
and his
refusal to listen or answer does not, without more,
furnish those grounds.
United States v. Mendenhall,
16

to

supra, 446 U.S., at 556, 100 S.Ct., at 1878 (opinion of
Stewart, J . ) .
Rover, 460 U.S. at 498, 103 S. Ct. at 1324; accord Truiillo. 739
P.2d at 88.
Mr. Kartchner's statement in response to whether he had
a warrant merely stated a truism:

any citizen "may" or "might" or

may be unsure if they have warrants.

The only reliable method of

determining warrants is to do a warrants check, a task only the
authorities can perform.
widespread

that

legislation.

it

Theft of identity has become sufficiently

has

recently

become

a

topic

of

federal

The possibility of the existence of a warrant for a

person of the same name is in itself reason enough to be wary of
giving your name to police.

See, e.g., State v. Wendell Navanick,

pending before this Court as Case No. 981398-CA (defendant picked
up on a warrant in his name, although warrant was actually for a
different

individual

with

the

same

name).

Without

more,

a

statement by an individual that he "may" or "might" have warrants
only states the obvious, and does not raise a reasonable suspicion
that there is in fact a warrant.
The trial court relied on its mistaken factual finding
#8: "The Deputy then asked if the defendant had outstanding arrest
warrants and the defendant responded that he probably did."

As set

forth in Point I, supra at 7, that factual finding is unsupported
and against the great weight of the evidence.

The evidence only

establishes that Mr. Kartchner only said he "might" or "may" or
"I'm not sure if I have" warrants.

R. 101, 184:7, --8. The true

facts do not establish reasonable suspicion.
17

Absent reasonable suspicion, Mr. Kartchner's detention
was unlawful.

Contraband obtained in the search incident to arrest

should have been suppressed as unattenuated fruit of the illegal
seizure.

United States v. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9

L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).

CONCLUSION
Based
requests

that

on
the

the

foregoing,

trial

court's

Mr.

order

Kartchner
denying

respectfully

his

motion

to

suppress be reversed, and that the case be remanded to allow him to
withdraw his conditional plea.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

* ^

^Jm

day of February, 1999.
A

ROBERT K. HEINEMAN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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Appeals, 450 South State Street, P.O. Box 140230, Salt Lake City,
UT 84114-0230, and four copies to the Attorney General's Office,
Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South 6th Floor, P.O. Box
140854,

Salt

Lake

City,
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84114-0854, this

//

day

February, 1999.

Robert K. Heineman

DELIVERED/MAILED this

day of February, 1999.
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ADDENDUM A
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT, R. 171-4

THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 971019499 FS

SHANE MARK KARTCHNER,
Defendant.
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail

Judge:
Date:

LESLIE LEWIS
October 2, 1998

PRESENT
Clerk:
chells
Prosecutor: MARK S. KOURIS
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): RALPH DELLAPIANA
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: September 25, 1960
Video
Tape Number:
10:13 am
CHARGES
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/14/1998 Guilty Plea
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in
the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.

Page 1

Case No: 971019499
Date:
Oct 02, 1998

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Jail time is to run concurrent to the jail time now serving.
Based on the defendant's conviction of the following:
ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE F3 the defendant is
sentenced to a term of 12 month(s) in the. The total time
suspended for this case is 12 month(s)•
Credit is granted for time served.
Credit is granted for 58 day(s) previously served.
SENTENCE JAIL SUSPENDED NOTE
The 12 months jail time is stayed until appeal is determined.
Total Fine: $1000.00
Total Suspended: $0
Total Surcharge: $850.00
Total Amount Due: $1850.00
SENTENCE TRUST
The defendant is to pay the following:
Attorney Fees:
Amount: $300.00
Pay to:
LEGAL DEFENDARS OFFICE
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
Defendant is granted credit for time served.
Defendant is granted credit for 58 day(s) served.
Defendant is to pay a fine of $1850.00 where the surcharge has been
added to the fine.
Pay fine to THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC,

Page 2

\-x\

Case No: 971019499
Date:
Oct 02, 1998

PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult
Probation & Parole.
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any
Law Enforcement Officer.
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or
illegal drugs.
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law
Enforcement Officer.
Participate in and complete any educational; and/or vocational
training as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and
Parole.
Violate no laws.
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and
Parole.
Submit to drug testing.
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise
distributed illegally.
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.
Enter into and complete the outpatient Odyssey House treatment
program.
No warrant is needed for officer or APPD for searches.
Full time work after 30 days of completion of the Odyssey House
Program. May be through temporary agency until full time work can
be obtained.
Fine may be reduced or the defendant may do community service work
hours. This may be determined after the treatment issue has been
discussed.
Fine may be reduced as much as 1/2.
Pay $300.00 recoupment fee.
Vocational rehabilitation and Mental Health evaluation through
Odyssey House.

Case No: 971019499
Date:
Oct 02, 1998
Dated this

Q

day of

LESLIE~ LEWIS:
District Coufct Judge; ;

Page 4 (last)
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ADDENDUM B
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS, ORDER, R. 136-9

tiuiD D;S?R;CT COUS?

E. NEAL GUNNARSON
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
MARK S. KOURIS, 6594
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
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SALT LAKE COUNTY
n o 9m,CLJ&
Dooutv Cie::;

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

I
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

-vs-

CaseNo. 971019499FS
SHANE KARTCHNER,
Judge Leslie A. Lewis
Defendant.

Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence, filed on the above captioned matter, was
heard by this Court on June 4, 1998, at 8:30 A.M. Defendant was present and represented by
Ralph Dellapiana. The State of Utah was represented by Mark S. Kouris, Deputy District
Attorney. Testimony was taken by one witness and both parties briefed and argued the pertinent
issues. Being fully advised, the Court makes the following Findings of Facts and Conclusions of
Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The State of Utah charged the defendant by Information of Unlawful Possession
of a Controlled Substance, to wit: Methamphetamine; and Unlawful Possession of
Drug Paraphernalia.

2.

The State based its Information on activities occurring on October 18,1997 at 50
West 3900 South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

iu

On that date, Sheriff's Deputy Michael A. Ashley traveled eastbound on 3900
South and noticed the defendant standing on the street at about 50 West.
For traffic management and the defendant's safety, Deputy Ashley activated his
overhead lights and exited his vehicle to assist the defendant.
The defendant explained that he had wrecked his bicycle on the road.
Despite scrape marks on the defendant's elbows, the defendant refused medical
assistance.
Based on the refusal of medical treatment, Deputy Ashley inquired as to the
defendant's name for completion of his accident report and the defendant refused
to provide it.
The Deputy then asked if the defendant had outstanding arrest warrants and the
defendant responded that he probably did.
At that time the Deputy directed the defendant to "wait" while he confirmed the
existence of warrants.
The Deputy confirmed outstanding warrants for the defendant and placed him
under arrest.
During a search incident to arrest, the Deputy found three small bags of an off
white powder, a syringe and a glass tube.
The defendant then admitted that the powder and paraphernalia belonged to him.
The defendant also admitted that he ingested the substance on two occasions
earlier that day.
Deputy Ashley field-tested the powder and it tested positive for the presence of
methamphetamine.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The activation of the Deputy's vehicle's overhead lights did not constitute a
seizure as its stated and obvious purpose was to facilitate public safety.

2.

Based on the defendant's refusal to give the Deputy his name, coupled with the
defendant's admission that he probably had outstanding arrest warrants, the
Deputy had reasonable suspicion to direct the defendant to wait while he checked
for the existence of warrants.

DATED this

I

day of

V

j£st~>~^

, 1998

BY T H g ^ U R T :

HiM^
I^SLIE A. LEWIS, Judge
Approved as to form:

Kalpn Dellapiana
Attorney for the Defendant

E. NEAL GUNNARSON
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
MARK S. KOURIS, 6594
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER

Plaintiff,
-vs-

CaseNo.971019499FS
SHANE KARTCHNER,
Judge Leslie A. Lewis
Defendant.

The Court having reviewed the evidence and the law and having entered Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law based thereon:
The Court hereby orders that defendanl^Motion to Suppress Evidence is denied.

Hc/n
DATED this

71 L

f

)

_, 1998.

LESLIE A. LEWIS, Judge
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